The MI9 "Stay Put" Order of 1943: How a Secret Command Doomed Thousands of Allied POWs in Italy

The MI9 "Stay Put" Order of 1943: How a Secret Command Doomed Thousands of Allied POWs in Italy

In the summer of 1943, as the Allies prepared to invade the Italian mainland, roughly 80,000 Allied prisoners of war sat in Italian camps. A single decision made inside Britain's escape-and-evasion intelligence branch, MI9, would shape what happened to them. That decision, later known as the "Stay Put" order, told the prisoners to remain in their camps and wait for liberation rather than break out and run. When events did not unfold as planned, the order became one of the most criticized intelligence decisions of the war. This article explains who made it, why, how it was communicated, and what happened to the men whose fate it decided.

Who Was Norman Crockatt?

The order is closely associated with Norman Crockatt, the officer who founded and ran MI9. Crockatt had served in the First World War, then left the army in the late 1920s and became a stockbroker in the City of London, eventually rising to a senior position in the financial world before being recalled to service. According to biographical accounts, he had risen to lead the London Stock Exchange during the interwar years. When MI9 was created on December 23, 1939, the Joint Intelligence Committee chose Crockatt as its director. He held the post until 1945 and was promoted to brigadier during the war.

Crockatt's lack of a conventional intelligence background was not seen as disqualifying. MI9 was a new kind of organization with no established doctrine, and his administrative skill and willingness to improvise suited the role. The decisions he made there, including the Italian "Stay Put" order, were therefore largely his to shape.

What MI9 Was Created to Do

MI9 was the British military intelligence branch responsible for helping captured personnel escape and helping evaders avoid capture. Its work included smuggling escape aids to prisoners, such as maps hidden in playing cards or game boards and miniature compasses, and supporting downed aircrew and stranded soldiers trying to reach neutral or Allied-held territory. The branch also maintained covert communication links with prisoners inside enemy camps.

That communication capability is central to the story. Because MI9 could pass coded messages to POWs, it could, in principle, issue instructions to men it could not physically reach. This made it possible for a decision taken in London to be transmitted directly to camps deep inside enemy-controlled Italy.

The Decision Crockatt Faced in 1943

By mid-1943 the strategic picture in the Mediterranean was shifting quickly. The Allies had cleared North Africa and were preparing to land in Sicily and then on the Italian mainland. Inside Italy were tens of thousands of Allied prisoners, many of them captured during the desert campaigns. The figure usually cited is around 80,000 men.

Crockatt had to weigh two broad options. The prisoners could be told to stay in their camps and wait to be liberated as Allied forces advanced, or they could be encouraged to break out and make their own way toward friendly lines. Each path carried serious risks. A mass breakout would scatter weakened men across hostile countryside, where many faced recapture, reprisal, or death. Staying put kept them together and in relative safety, but only if liberation actually arrived in time.

The "Stay Put" Order of June 7, 1943

Crockatt chose to keep the prisoners in place. In an order dated June 7, 1943, MI9 directed that, in the event of an Allied invasion of Italy, officers commanding prison camps were to ensure that prisoners of war remained within their camps. The order also gave camp leaders authority to take disciplinary action to prevent individual prisoners from attempting to break out and rejoin their own units.

The reasoning behind the order was not unreasonable on its own terms. Many prisoners were physically run down after long captivity. A disorganized mass escape into German- and fascist-controlled territory could expose them to attack. And there was an expectation that the Allied advance up the Italian peninsula would be relatively rapid, so that the camps would be overrun and liberated before long. Given the information available in June 1943, holding the men in place looked like the safer course.

How the Order Was Transmitted

One of the most striking details of the episode is the method MI9 used to deliver the instruction. Rather than an open broadcast, the branch concealed coded messages inside the scripts of a popular BBC program for the troops, "The Radio Padre," presented by the Reverend Ronald Selby Wright. A set phrase in the broadcast signaled to those who understood the code that a hidden instruction was being passed. Through this channel, the "Stay Put" order reached camp leaders inside Italy.

The technique reflects the ingenuity of British escape intelligence, which routinely hid messages and equipment in ordinary objects and broadcasts. But using such an indirect channel for an order affecting tens of thousands of lives also meant that the chain of command behind the decision stayed almost entirely within MI9.

The Problem of Who Was Not Told

Here lies the heart of the controversy. According to accounts of the episode, MI9 did not brief Prime Minister Winston Churchill or the War Cabinet about the "Stay Put" order. Churchill had wanted prisoners returned to Allied hands once Italy surrendered, and the terms of the Italian armistice reflected that aim: Allied prisoners were to be handed over to the Allied command and not evacuated to Germany. A decision to keep prisoners passively in their camps sat uneasily alongside that political objective, yet the country's highest leadership was reportedly unaware of it.

The episode therefore raises lasting questions about accountability. A relatively junior part of the intelligence machine had, in effect, set policy over the fate of 80,000 men without consulting the political and military leadership whose plans it touched. Whatever the operational logic, the absence of that consultation is what historians have most sharply criticized.

The Armistice and What Actually Happened

Italy signed an armistice with the Allies that was announced on September 8, 1943. The assumption behind the "Stay Put" order, a swift Allied advance, did not hold. Instead of a rapid liberation, German forces moved quickly to occupy Italy, seize the camps, and take control of the prisoners before Allied troops could reach them.

The results were grim for many. According to accounts of the period, a large share of the prisoners, perhaps around 50,000, remained in or near their camps in the first days after the armistice and were captured by the Germans, with many transported north into German captivity. Others did leave their camps. Estimates suggest tens of thousands took to the countryside; of these, many were recaptured, several thousand reached Switzerland, and a substantial number eventually evaded capture entirely, often thanks to the help of Italian civilians who sheltered them at great personal risk. Sources indicate that a large portion of the prisoners ultimately avoided long-term recapture, but thousands fell into German hands, and the human cost of the order has been counted in the thousands of lives.

The Rescue Effort That Followed

Once it was clear that the situation had gone wrong, the Allies tried to recover as many escaped prisoners as they could. Lieutenant Colonel A. C. "Tony" Simonds, who ran MI9's relevant section in the Mediterranean within the cover organization known as "A" Force, was ordered in late September 1943 to organize a rescue effort. The operation, codenamed Simcol, involved landing and parachuting small parties along the Italian coast to make contact with former prisoners and guide them to rendezvous points where they could be evacuated by sea.

The results were modest relative to the scale of the problem. Simonds estimated that only around 900 former prisoners were brought out by boat or on foot through these organized efforts in the autumn of 1943, with many more relying on their own initiative and on Italian help. The rescue operations could recover only a fraction of the men the original order had kept waiting.

Why the Episode Still Matters

The "Stay Put" order is studied today because it captures the tension between military caution and political responsibility. Crockatt's reasoning was defensible given what was known in June 1943: weakened prisoners, dangerous terrain, and an expected fast advance all argued for keeping the men together. But the decision rested on an assumption about the speed of liberation that proved wrong, and it was taken without informing the leadership whose strategic aims it affected.

The case is a reminder that in decisions touching tens of thousands of lives, the process matters as much as the judgment. Good intentions and sound operational logic did not protect the prisoners once the central assumption failed and once the decision had been kept inside a narrow channel. The episode endures as a cautionary study in wartime command, oversight, and the limits of even ingenious intelligence work.

FAQ

Q1: What was the MI9 "Stay Put" order?

It was an order issued by Britain's escape-and-evasion intelligence branch, MI9, dated June 7, 1943. It directed that, in the event of an Allied invasion of Italy, commanders of Allied POW camps were to keep prisoners inside the camps to wait for liberation rather than allow them to break out. Camp leaders were also given authority to take disciplinary action against prisoners who tried to escape and rejoin their units.

Q2: Who issued the order and why?

The order is associated with Norman Crockatt, the founder and director of MI9. He reasoned that many prisoners were physically weakened, that a mass breakout into hostile territory was dangerous, and that the Allied advance through Italy would be fast enough to liberate the camps quickly. Holding the men in place looked safer given the information available at the time.

Q3: How was the order communicated to the prisoners?

MI9 concealed coded instructions inside the scripts of a BBC program for the troops, "The Radio Padre," presented by the Reverend Ronald Selby Wright. A prearranged signal in the broadcast indicated that a hidden message was being sent, allowing camp leaders to receive the instruction without an open announcement.

Q4: Why is the order considered controversial?

Two reasons. First, the assumption behind it, a rapid Allied advance, did not hold, and German forces occupied Italy and seized many prisoners before the Allies arrived. Second, according to accounts of the episode, MI9 did not inform Prime Minister Winston Churchill or the War Cabinet of the decision, even though it affected the fate of around 80,000 men and touched Churchill's stated aim of recovering the prisoners.

Q5: What happened to the prisoners after the September 1943 armistice?

After the armistice was announced on September 8, 1943, German forces moved quickly to take over the camps. A large number of prisoners who stayed put were captured and many were moved into German captivity. Others left their camps; of those, many were recaptured, several thousand reached Switzerland, and a significant number ultimately evaded capture with the help of Italian civilians. A follow-up rescue operation, codenamed Simcol, recovered only a few hundred men.